A quantum key distribution link has a range. Beyond roughly a few hundred kilometres of fibre, the signal is too weak for a usable key rate. A quantum repeater would solve this without compromise. Quantum repeaters are not a product you can buy. What you can buy is a trusted node.
How a trusted node works
A trusted node sits between two links. It holds the key from the first link and the key from the second, combines them, and forwards the result. End to end, two parties who share no direct link end up with the same key. The physics is intact on each hop.

What you give up
For the duration of the relay, the node holds key material in the clear. Anyone with physical or logical control of that node can read it. The security of the end to end key is therefore the security of the weakest node on the path, not the security of the quantum channel.
Which is a familiar problem
This is the same assumption operators already make about a locked rack in a data centre or a street cabinet with a monitored door. The difference is that it is now explicit, and it can be engineered against: hardware security modules, tamper detection, restricted operational access, and node placement inside facilities the operator already controls.
How to decide
Ask where the trusted nodes would physically sit. If every node on the path is inside a facility you already trust with your classical key infrastructure, the trade-off costs you little. If the path crosses a site you would not put a root certificate authority in, it is worth redesigning the topology before the equipment arrives.
The honest summary: trusted nodes extend reach today at the cost of an assumption that repeaters will one day remove. Deployments that are clear about this age well.